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Abstract In order to support efficient compilation to modern architectures, main-
stream programming languages, such as C/C++ and Java, have adopted weak (or
relaxed) memory models. According to these weak memory models, multithreaded
programs are allowed to exhibit behaviours that would have been inconsistent under
the traditional strong (i.e., sequentially consistent) memory model. This makes the
task of reasoning about concurrent programs even more challenging. The GPS frame-
work, developed by Turon et al. [23], has made a step forward towards tackling this
challenge for the release-acquire fragment of the C11 memory model. By integrating
ghost states, per-location protocols and separation logic, GPS can successfully verify
programs with release-acquire atomics.
In this paper, we introduced GPS+ to support a larger class of C11 programs,
that is, programs with release-acquire atomics, relaxed atomics and release-acquire
fences. Key elements of our proposed logic include two new types of assertions, a
more expressive resource model and a set of new verification rules.
1 Introduction
In concurrent programming, memory consistency models define how different threads
may interact with each other using shared memory. Most work on concurrent program
verification assumes the sequentially consistency (SC) memory model [14]. Under
SC, there is a single global memory and threads take turns to access it. Within each
thread instructions are executed in order, and each update to memory becomes visible
to all threads at the same time and as soon as it occurs.
Although the SC model is intuitive and simplifies reasoning about concurrent pro-
grams, for efficiency reasons current hardware does not follow the SC model. In fact,
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[msg]rlx := 42;
[flg]rlx := 1;
repeat [flg]rlx end;
[msg]rlx; // 42 or 0
(1) No sync
The protocol fails in this case, as the memory
order for the commands here are specified as
“relaxed”, which allows “out-of-order” execu-
tion and thus the stale value 0 can be read.
[msg]rlx := 42;
[flg]rel := 1;
repeat [flg]acq end;
[msg]rlx; // 42
(2) Sync with release-acquire atomics
To fix this program, we change the writing of
flg to have “release” ordering and the reading
of flg to have “acquire” ordering to enforce a
synchronisation between the two threads.
[msg]rlx := 42;
fencerel;
[flg]rlx := 1;
repeat [flg]rlx end;
fenceacq;
[msg]rlx; // 42
(3) Sync with fences
Fences are another important type of synchro-
nisation primitives in C11. By using fences, the
synchronisation can be decoupled with the writ-
ing and the (repeated) reading of flg to gain
flexibility and potential improvement in effi-
ciency.
These examples are about a 2-thread message
passing program, where both msg and flg are
initialised as 0. The left hand side thread first
writes the message 42 then set flg to be 1 indi-
cating the message is ready to be read. The right
hand side thread repeatedly reads flg until it
reads a non-zero value (1, in this case) then it
read the msg, expecting to get 42.
Fig. 1: Message passing examples
implementing SC over current hardware is expensive because costly synchronisation
instructions (e.g., hardware fences) are required to keep memory operations properly
synchronised, thereby also preventing many compiler and runtime optimisations.
As a result, modern hardware architectures and programming languages have
adopted what is known as relaxed (or weak) memory models. In these models, differ-
ent threads may observe that shared memory operations happen in different orders.
For instance, x86 follows the total-store-order (TSO) model, in which all the stores
are totally ordered but threads may observe their own stores early. ARM and PowerPC
architectures have even weaker memory models. Similarly, to allow programmers to
write more efficient concurrent code, programming languages like C/C++ and Java
follow a weak memory model [1,17].
In this paper, we focus on the C/C++ memory model (henceforth, C11). As a
weak memory model, it allows different threads to have different observations of the
memory, unless some synchronisations are enforced between them. In C11, synchro-
nisations are formed by using release and acquire operations. Intuitively, a release
operation shares its knowledge about the lastest memory updates, which is picked up
by the acquire operations from other threads. We demonstrate this idea by using the
examples shown in Fig. 11.
In order to be able to reason about concurrent programs, there is therefore a de-
mand for relaxed programming logics—that is, logics for reasoning about concurrent
programs under weak memory models. For the C11 memory model, there are notable
program logics such as Relaxed Separation Logic (RSL) [24] and GPS [23], both of
1 Here we explain these examples in an intuitive manner, leaving the formal introductions of syntax and
semantics to the next section.
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Val v ::= x | V where V ∈ N
Exp e ::= v | v + v | v == v | v mod v | let x = e in e | if v then e else e | fork e
| repeat e end | alloc(n) | [v]O | [v]O := v | fenceO | CAS(v, v, v) | FAI(v)
MO O ::= rel | acq | rlx | na
EvalCtx K ::= [ ] | let x = K in e
Fig. 2: A language for C11 concurrency with relaxed atomics and fences
which are extensions of separation logic. RSL supports invariant-based reasoning and
ownership transfer via C11 release/acquire accesses, whereas GPS supports more ad-
vanced protocol-style reasoning. The more advanced of these logics, GPS, has been
successfully applied to verify an implementation of Linux’s RCU synchronisation
primitive [21].
Neither of these logics, however, supports the full range of features of the C11
memory model. In this paper, we concentrate on two key features that are not sup-
ported (or only rudimentally supported): memory fences and relaxed atomic accesses.
Our work extends GPS to support these features, thereby making the extended GPS+
applicable to a much bigger class of C11 programs. There has been a very recent
closely related line of work on extending RSL with support for these features [8], but
given that GPS is substantially more advanced than RSL, the soundness argument for
our extension is substantially more complex than that of [8].
To support relaxed atomics and fences, we introduce two new types of assertions,
namely shareable assertions and waiting-to-be-acquired assertions. We design a set
of new verification rules that can verify programs with release/acquire atomics, re-
laxed atomics and release/acquire fences. We have formulated the soundness proof
of the proposed verification logic.
Our work is based on the C11 memory model [1], which we describe in §2. We
then briefly introduce GPS in §3 and present our new program logic GPS+ in §4.
The new rules are put into action in §5 with an illustrative example. §6 presents the
resource model of our logic, while §7 formulates the soundness proof of our proposed
program logic. We conclude in §8 with a discussion of related and future work.
2 The Language and the Memory Model
We first present the syntax and semantics for a language capturing the essential C11
features, an extension of the core language used in GPS [23]; we then introduce the
(simplified) C11 memory model on which our work is based.
2.1 The Language
Our core language (Fig. 2) is an expression-oriented language with pointer arith-
metic, let-bindings (which form the only evaluation context K), conditional state-
ments, thread forking, repeat e commands (which repeatedly execute the body e until
a non-zero value is returned), memory allocation, load, store and fence operations
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Action α ::= S | A(`..`′) |W(`, V,O) | R(`, V,O) | U(`, V, V ) | F(O)
ActName a (from an infinite set)
ActMap A ∈ ActName fin⇀ Action
Graph G = (A, sb,mo, rf) where sb,mo, rf ⊆ dom(A)× dom(A)
ThreadMap T ∈ N fin⇀ (ActName× Exp)
Fig. 3: Syntax of event graph
annotated with a specific memory order (mo), and the atomic operations compare-
and-swap and fetch-and-increment.
The memory order annotation can be rel (for release-atomic stores), acq (for
acquire-atomic loads), rlx (for relaxed atomic accesses), and na (for non-atomic ac-
cesses). Fence commands can be annotated with rel or acq. For the atomic compare-
and-swap and fence-and-increment commands, we assume they have both rel and
acq effects in case the operation succeeds, and only acq in case the update does not
take place (in the case of CAS).
2.2 The Graph Semantics
The C11 memory model allows different threads to have different observations of
the memory. Therefore, its semantics is not expressed in terms of changing a single
shared memory, but rather keeps track of the entire history of an execution. In the
formal C11 model by Batty et al. [2], an execution is represented as a labelled event
graph and there is a set of axioms judging whether the execution is consistent ac-
cording to the memory model (e.g. whether an access to a certain location leads to a
data-race, or if it is possible for a read action to return a certain value).
Fig. 3 gives the definition of an event graph, which is formed by an action map and
three relations. The sequenced-before relation sb records the order of events as speci-
fied in the program. As in GPS and RSL, we make this relation not transitive. Thus it
relates each node only to its immediate successor in program order. The modification-
order mo is a strict, total order on all writing actions to the same location. The reads-
from relation rf relates a writing action to the reading actions that read from it. Since
it is functional in its codomain, we often write rf(r) for the write action w such that
rf(w, r).
Following GPS, event graphs are generated from programs by a two-layered op-
erational semantics, whose rules are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, where C is the word
size. In the event layer, actions are generated from program expressions e α→ e′. Note
that a load operation generates a read action R with an arbitrary value. The actual
value read is constrained by the C11 memory model in the second layer of semantics.
Note also that S stands for a skip action, A for a memory allocation, W for a write, U
for an atomic update, and F for a fence action.
In the second layer of semantics, instead of transforming expressions, a machine
step changes machine configurations 〈T ;G〉. Here T is the pool of threads maintaining
the identity of the last event produced by each thread and their corresponding con-
tinuation expressions, and G is the event graph built up so far. In the graph G, all the
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let x = V in e
S→ e[V/x]
repeat e end
S→ let x = e in if x then x else repeat e end
alloc(n)
A(`..`+n−1)−−−−−−−−−→ `
[`]O
R(`,V,O)−−−−−−→ V
[`]O := V
W(`,V,O)−−−−−−→ 0
CAS(`, Vo, Vn)
U(`,Vo,Vn)−−−−−−−→ 1
CAS(`, Vo, Vn)
R(`,V ′,rlx)−−−−−−−−→ 0 V ′ 6= Vo
FAI(`)
U(`,V,V ′)−−−−−−−→ V V ′ = (V + 1) mod C
fenceO
F(O)−−−→ 0
K[e]
α−→ K[e′] e α−→ e′
Fig. 4: Some event-step semantic rules: e α→ e′
e
α→ e′ consistentC11(G′)
G′.A = G.A ] [a′ 7→ α] G′.sb = G.sb ] (a, a′)
G.mo ⊆ G′.mo G.rf ⊆ G′.rf ⊆ G.rf ] (b, a′)
〈T ] [i 7→ (a, e)];G〉 −→ 〈T ] [i 7→ (a′, e′)];G′〉
〈T ] [i 7→ (a,K[fork (e)])];G〉 −→ 〈T ] [i 7→ (a,K[0]) ] [j 7→ (a, e)];G〉
Fig. 5: Machine step semantics: 〈T ;G〉 −→ 〈T ′;G′〉
events that have taken place are recorded in the action map A and are connected with
three kinds of directed edges, namely sb, mo and rf.
From a machine configuration 〈T ;G〉, a move from an arbitrary thread can transfer
into a new machine configuration 〈T ′;G′〉 if the newly constructed graph G′ is legal
under C11 memory model: consistentC11(G′).
2.3 The Memory Model
2.3.1 Happens-Before Relation
We have so far introduced sb, mo and rf. Now we describe the essential part of the
memory model: synchronisations. Different from GPS and RSL, now fences can also
form synchronisations. Our memory model is still simplified when compared with
the standard [1] (for example, the subtle release-sequence is omitted).
We first introduce a derived relation synchronised-with (sw ⊆ dom(A)× dom(A)).As
illustrated in Fig. 6, a pair of release write and acquire read can synchronise. Relaxed
atomics can also synchronise with the help of corresponding fences.
The idea of synchronisation in C11 is that when an event c is synchronised with
another event b, i.e. (b, c) ∈ sw, then b’s observation about its preceding memory up-
dates becomes visible to c (and its succeeding events) as well. Based on this, the heart
of the C11 memory model, happens-before relation, can be defined as: hb , (sb ∪ sw)+.
For instance, Fig. 7 represents an execution of the program shown in the case (2)
of Fig. 1. When the acquire load c reads from (rf) the release store b, a synchronised-
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a: W(−,− ,rel) b: R(−,− ,acq)
rf
sw
a: F(rel)
c: W(−,− ,rlx) b: R(−,− ,acq)rf
sb
+
sw
a: W(−,− ,rel) c: R(−,− ,rlx)
b: F(acq)
rf sb
+sw
a: F(rel)
c: W(−,− ,rlx)
b: R(−,− ,rlx)
b: F(acq)
rf
sb
+
sb
+sw
Fig. 6: Four ways to form synchronization
Thread 1 :
a : W(msg, 42, rlx)
b : W(flg, 1, rel)
Thread 2 :
c : R(flg, 1, acq)
d : R(msg, 42, rlx)
sb sbr
f
sw
hb
Fig. 7: Message passing using
release write and acquire read
Thread 1 :
a : W(msg, 42, rlx)
b : W(flg, 1, rlx)
Thread 2 :
c : R(flg, 1, rlx)
d : R(msg, ?, rlx)
sb sbrf
Fig. 8: Failed message passing
with (sw) relation is established between them. Consequently, information observed
by the source store b is eligible to be shared with the reader c. In particular, this
ensures d is aware that a has happened, thus it will not read the stale value 0.
On the other hand if either one or both of actions on flg are relaxed as shown in
case (1) of Fig. 1 and Fig. 8, such sw relation fails to be established, which means the
out-of-order executions allowed by the C11 standard may cause d to read the value 0
as well.
2.3.2 Data-Race and Memory Error
C11 provides various levels of memory consistency orders, from the most strict
sequentially-consistent sc to the most relaxed non-atomic na (which does not even
ensure atomicity), as a handy feature for users to flexibly balance the efficiency and
safety of their programs. However, one must remember that when two events concur-
rently access a non-atomic location and at least one of them is a write event, it will
lead to a data race. The C11 standard declares that if an execution is data-race free,
the non-atomic actions will perform as they are sequentially-consistent; otherwise,
the result of execution is undefined. Another situation that will lead to an undefined
result is a memory error, which happens when an event accesses a location that has
not been allocated.
2.3.3 Axioms
Following Batty et al. [2], the C11 memory model is formulated as a set of axioms
(over an event graph G) in Fig. 9, denoted as consistentC11(G). In the machine step
layer of semantics, the execution of our program is restricted by the C11 memory
model via the checking with consistentC11(G), e.g. a load can not read from a write
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consistentC11((A, sb,mo, rf)) 
∀a, b. mo(a, b) ⇒ ∃. writes(a, ,−),writes(b, ,−) (ConsistentMO1)
∧ ∀. strictTotalOrder({a | writes(a, ,−)},mo) (ConsistentMO2)
∧ ∀b. rf(b) = ⊥ ⇔ ∃, a. writes(a, ,−) ∧ reads(b, ,−) ∧ hb(a, b) (ConsistentRF1)
∧ ∀a, b. rf(b) = a ⇒ ∃, V. writes(a, , V ) ∧ reads(b, , V ) ∧ ¬hb(b, a) (ConsistentRF2)
∧ ∀a, b. rf(b) = a ∧ (isNonatomic(a) ∨ isNonatomic(b)) ⇒ hb(a, b) (ConsistentRFNA)
∧ ∀a, b. hb(a, b) ⇒ a = b∧
¬mo(rf(b), rf(a)) ∧ ¬mo(rf(b), a) ∧ ¬mo(b, rf(a)) ∧ ¬mo(b, a) (Conherence)
∧ ∀a, c. isUpd(c) ∧ rf(c) = a ⇒ mo(a, c)∧  ∃b. mo(a, b) ∧mo(b, c) (AtomicCAS)
∧ ∀a = b, #» , #» ′. A(a) = A( #» ) ∧A(b) = A( #» ′) ⇒ #» ∩ #» ′ = ∅ (ConsistentAlloc)
∧ acyclic(hb ∪ rf) (Acyclic)
where strictTotalOrder(S,R)  (  ∃a. R(a, a))
∧ (∀a, b, c. R(a, b) ∧R(b, c) ⇒ R(a, c)) ∧ (∀a, b ∈ S. a = b ⇒ R(a, b) ∨R(b, a))
acyclic(R)   ∃x. R+(x, x)
reads(a, , V )  A(a) ∈ R(, V,−),U(, V,−)
writes(a, , V )  A(a) ∈ W(, V,−),U(,−, V )
Fig. 9: The C11 axioms
that “happens-after” (ConsistentRF2) and no location should be allocated more than
once (ConsistentAlloc).
2.3.4 Thin-Air Read and the Strengthening of the Memory Model
Our core language includes relaxed atomic operations. However in the C11 memory
model, relaxed atomics are known to have the thin-air-read issue [2], which refers to
the problem that a program will allow a relaxed atomic read to return any value out
of the thin air, without breaking the very few restrictions applied to relaxed atomics
(Fig. 10). This problem makes it impossible to rigorously reason about a program
with relaxed atomics. To rule out thin-air reads, we follow the same approach as RSL
[24], i.e. we add an extra axiom, Acyclic, to the consistency check (Fig. 9).
let r1 = [x]rlx;
[x]rlx := r1;
let r2 = [x]rlx;
[x]rlx := r2;
(a) The program, where r1, r2 are local
variables and x is shared location with
initial value 0
Thread 1 :
a : R(x, 42, rlx)
b : W(x, 42, rlx)
Thread 2 :
c : R(x, 42, rlx)
d : W(x, 42, rlx)
sb sbr
f
rf
(b) An arbitrary value 42 may pop up
out of “thin-air”
Fig. 10: A program and its “thin-air-read” execution
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3 The GPS Framework
Our proposed reasoning mechanism is built on top of the GPS framework [23,21],
which combines three concepts advocated by state-of-the-art concurrent program log-
ics (e.g. [25,9,7,3,15,6,22,18,20,4,13]), namely ghost states, protocols and separa-
tion logic, and adapts them in a novel way to support modular weak memory reason-
ing.
Compared with separation logic, GPS introduces state assertions, ` : s τ , to keep
track of the modifications to atomic locations; knowledge, P , for the duplicable as-
sertions, e.g. pure assertions, state assertions for atomics, etc.; escrow to wrap up
ownership dependent assertions (e.g. assertions about non-atomic locations x ↪→ v)
before they can be spread to other threads; ghost assertions, γ : t µ , and ghost move,
V, for auxiliary states. To support these advanced features, resources are used to log-
ically represent computation states. A resource r ∈ Resource is a triple (Π, g,Σ) where
the physical location map Π maps each location to either a value (for non-atomics)
or a protocol and state (for atomics), the ghost identity map g keeps the ghost values,
and the known escrow set Σ contains all escrows available. Resources form a partially
commutative monoid (PCM) with composition ⊕. Semantics of assertions is provided
by this resource model. For instance, the separation assertion P1 ∗ P2 is interpreted as
the current state r can be split into two compatible parts, r = r1 ⊕ r2, where r1 satis-
fies P1 and r2 satisfies P2. GPS uses triple in the form of {P} e {x.Q}, where x is a
placeholder for the return value in Q and can be omitted if Q does not describe the
return value. It states if e terminates in a value v, the resources will satisfy Q[v/x].
We shall first give a brief introduction about GPS, focusing on atomic writes/reads
and escrows, which are essential for synchronisations.
3.1 Protocols for Atomic Locations
Following the C11 standard, atomic locations in GPS are meant to be read and written
concurrently. Therefore it is difficult to make any stable assertions about the precise
contents of an atomic location. GPS advocates per-location protocols to describe how
the contents of each atomic location can evolve over time. A state assertion ` : s τ
indicates that an atomic location l is governed by the protocol τ , and is at least at state
s. All possible state transition relations have to be defined in τ as a partial order vτ ;
and in τ , state interpretation τ(s, z) for each state s and its corresponding value z also
has to be specified.
The state assertions about atomic locations belong to knowledge in GPS, which
refers to assertions that do not depend on ownership. Intuitively, knowledge repre-
sents the statement of facts, and thus can be duplicated and spread to different threads.
From the resource point of view, a knowledge refers to a piece of resource r that is
compatible with itself, that is, r ⊕ r is defined. State assertions are ownership inde-
pendent because according to the C11 standard, atomic locations are meant to be
accessed concurrently (without hb ordering) in different threads. Correspondingly,
GPS assertions about their states can be present in different threads at the same time.
Conversely, the assertions about non-atomic locations (i.e. x ↪→ v) are not knowledge
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and must be owned by one thread at a time as concurrent access to them may raise
data races. Knowledge is indicated by a modality , and GPS has useful rules to
reason about knowledge:
` : s τ ⇒  ` : s τ , P ⇒ P and P ⇔ P ∗ P
The first rule says that a state assertion can be transformed into its knowledge form.
The second says knowledge can always be turned back into its normal assertion. And
the third shows that knowledge can be duplicated and thus be shared.
A state interpretation τ(s, z) for a protocol τ governing a location ` is an asser-
tion specifying what must be true for a thread to be permitted to write z to ` and
thus change it to state s. A read action which reads from this write may retrieve this
assertion. This approach elegantly captures the idea of synchronisations in the C11
standard. Intuitively, the write action happens before that read (as a synchronised-
with relation is formed between them), so it signifies that the effect of any preceding
actions (those happened-before the write) can be transmitted to the reading thread.
The rule for atomic (i.e. acquire) read in GPS is given as:
[GPS−ATOMIC−LOAD]
∀s′ wτ s. ∀z. τ(s′, z) ∗ P ⇒ Q{
` : s τ ∗ P
}
[`]acq
{
z. ∃s′. ` : s′ τ ∗ P ∗ Q
}
The possible writes that an atomic read can observe are quantified in the premise.
Note that only assertions in knowledge form (Q) can be gained, as it is possible
for multiple threads to all read the location at the same state and thus gain the same
assertion. Therefore if the assertion is not an ownership independent knowledge, data
races may occur. The inclusion of the assertion P enables rely-guarantee reasoning
through protocols [23].
The atomic (i.e. release) write rule in GPS is defined as:
[GPS−ATOMIC−STORE]
P V τ(s′′, v) ∗Q ∀s′ wτ s. τ(s′,−) ∗ P ⇒ s′′ wτ s′{
` : s τ ∗ P
}
[`]rel := v
{
` : s′′ τ ∗Q
}
Note that from the precondition we only know the lower bound state for ` is state s
(i.e. the location ` is at least at state s before the write takes place). Without knowing
which exact state ` might have possibly been moved to by environment actions prior
to this write, here the write moves it to state s′′ that is reachable from any state s′ such
that s′ wτ s. In the first premise, P is transformed to the state interpretation τ(s′′, v)
with some frame Q via a ghost move V. Ghost moves are another important con-
cept in GPS: they represent moves that only change logical states without affecting
the actual machine states. Ghost moves can take place any time that suits the logic
user’s needs. They can do useful things like creating ghost assertions, packing and
unpacking escrows, which we are going to discuss next.
3.2 Escrows for Non-Atomic Locations
According to the rule [GPS−ATOMIC−LOAD], only knowledge can be transmitted in
synchronisations. However, very often we need to transfer the ownership of non-
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atomic locations. To do this, GPS allows them to be wrapped up into knowledge
form and be retrieved at the right time, via the use of escrows.
An escrow of the form σ : P  Q can be considered as a safe-box protecting Q,
and the key to open it is P (which is not duplicable). Ghost moves are used to pack
and unpack escrows:
[GPS−ESCROW−PACK]
σ : P  Q
QV [σ]
[GPS−ESCROW−UNPACK]
σ : P  Q
P ∧ [σ]V Q
A packed escrow [σ] is an ownership-independent assertion and can also be used in
its knowledge form: [σ]⇔ [σ].
The “key” P is consumed once it has been used to unpack an escrow. There-
fore instead of using physical resources, ghost assertions are introduced to describe
the permissions to unpack an escrow. A ghost assertion γ : t µ says there is a ghost
variable γ, whose value is ghost permission t drawn from some partial commuta-
tive monoid (PCM) µ. New ghost t can appear out of thin air, with a fresh identity:
trueV ∃γ. γ : t µ .
A special kind of permission is token Tok. Tok has only two kinds of permissions:
ξ is the unit and represents empty permission; and  represents for full permission.
They are usually written as γ : ξ and γ :  for short.
4 GPS+ : Reasoning about Relaxed Atomics and Fences
We now present our key proposal: a program logic that supports the reasoning of
a bigger class of C11 programs (than GPS), including relaxed atomics and release-
acquire fences.
4.1 Two New Types of Assertions
We would like to handle relaxed atomic operations in a similar way as release and
acquire atomics are treated in GPS, since they are also applied on atomic locations.
Moreover, we would like to ensure that the idea of per-location protocols works for
all of them. However, as defined in §2.3 and illustrated in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, one
challenge is that relaxed atomics form synchronised-with relations differently from
release-acquire atomics: a sw relation is automatically set up when an acquire load
operation reads from a release store operation; but for relaxed atomics the C11 stan-
dard states that the sw relation can only be established with the help of fences2. Fig.
11 shows that fences are needed to restore the sw and thus the hb relations for the
example in Fig. 8.
We interpret these restrictions as (i) a relaxed atomic store operation can only
transmit the information that has been marked as shareable by a preceding release
fence; and (ii) a relaxed load should not put the knowledge gained from its loading
source to the current state, instead it should mark the knowledge as not yet available
2 Or via release sequences, which we do not consider in this paper.
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Thread 1 :
a : W(msg, 42, rlx)
e : F(rel)
b : W(flg, 1, rlx)
Thread 2 :
c : R(flg, 1, rlx)
f : F(acq)
d : R(msg, 42, rlx)
sb
sb
sb
sb
rf
sw
hb
Fig. 11: Message passing using relaxed atomics with fences
and await a succeeding acquire fence to transform them to normal knowledge form.
To cater for these new scenarios, we introduce two new types of assertions: shareable
assertions 〈P 〉, and waiting-to-be-acquired assertions P .
Intuitively 〈P 〉 indicates that P is shareable. That is, it can be transmitted to oth-
ers (even by a relaxed store operation). P signifies that knowledge received by a
relaxed load is not yet available according to the C11 standard. Reading, updating or
re-transmitting P is not permitted until an acquire fence transforms it into normal
knowledge P . Intuitively, the two new types of assertions provided an additional
dimension to evaluate assertions, based on if they (knowledge or not) can be used/-
transmitted by the current thread.
The formal semantics for these new assertions and their properties will be pre-
sented later in §6. It is worth noting here that unlike P ⇒ P , the property P ⇒ P
does not hold, as according to the C11 standard,  can only be stripped off by us-
ing an acquire fence. Moreover, unlike the knowledge symbol  that can be nested,
the nesting of shareable or waiting-to-be-acquired assertions is not allowed. As oth-
erwise, if an assertion like 〈P 〉 is permitted, after an acquire fence it immediately
becomes a shareable assertion, which clearly violates the C11 standard.
It is also worth noting that, in order to prevent improper assertions (like P or
〈P 〉) from being included in state interpretations for atomic variables, we require that
all state interpretations must be “normal" assertions, i.e. ∀τ, s, V. normal(τ(s, V )), where
normal(P ) , P⇒false ∨ 〈P 〉 6⇒ false. A similar restriction is applied to the assertions
used in escrows: for each escrow σ : P  P ′, we require normal(P ) and normal(P ′).
4.2 New Verification Rules
With the new forms of knowledge and assertions, we can now ensure that knowledge
will be distributed in a controlled manner both from the starting point (a store oper-
ation) and at the finishing point (a load operation). We present a number of newly-
designed verification rules in Fig. 12. The rules that are inherited from GPS without
change and the rule for FAI are left for the technical report [10].
Being atomic store operations, both release and relaxed stores can transmit some
extra information to their readers. But according to the standard and as pointed out
in their instrumented semantics we discussed before, the scopes of information that
are available for them to release are different. This difference is captured by our
rules. Being a store using a weaker memory order, a relaxed store can only use the
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[RELEASE−STORE]
P V τ(s′′, v) ∗Q ∀s′ wτ s. τ(s′,−) ∗ P ⇒ s′′ wτ s′{
` : s τ ∗ P
}
[`]rel := v
{
` : s′′ τ ∗Q
}
[RELAXED−STORE]
P2 V τ(s′′, v) ∗Q ∀s′ wτ s. τ(s′,−) ∗ P1 ∗ P2 ⇒ s′′ wτ s′{
` : s τ ∗ P1 ∗ 〈P2〉
}
[`]rlx := v
{
` : s′′ τ ∗ P1 ∗Q
}
[RELEASE−FENCE]
〈P 〉 6⇒ false
{P} fencerel {〈P 〉}
[ACQUIRE−LOAD]
∀s′ wτ s. ∀z. τ(s′, z) ∗ P ⇒ Q{
` : s τ ∗ P
}
[`]acq
{
z. ∃s′. ` : s′ τ ∗ P ∗ Q
}
[RELAXED−LOAD]
∀s′ wτ s. ∀z. τ(s′, z) ∗ P ⇒ Q{
` : s τ ∗ P
}
[`]rlx
{
z. ∃s′. ` : s′ τ ∗ P ∗ Q
} [ACQUIRE−FENCE]
{P} fenceacq {P}
[CAS]
∀s′ wτ s. τ(s′, vo) ∗ P1 ∗ P2 V ∃s′′ wτ s′. τ(s′′, vn) ∗ Q
∀s′′ wτ s. ∀y 6= vo. τ(s′′, y) ∗ P1 ⇒ R{
l : s τ ∗ P1 ∗ 〈P2〉
}
CAS(l, vo, vn)
{
z.∃s′′. l : s′′ τ ∗ ((z=1 ∗ Q)
∨(z=0 ∗ P1 ∗ 〈P2〉 ∗ R))
}
Fig. 12: New verification rules
assertion P2 that is marked as shareable in its precondition to imply the interpretation
of the state it is going to write, i.e. it can only transmit the things that are already
marked as shareable. Meanwhile, a release store uses a general assertion P , which is
not necessarily to be a shareable assertion, to ghostly imply the state interpretation it
needs. Note that P can also contain shareable assertions, in which case the following
[UNSHARE] ghost move becomes handy if the normal form of these assertions is
needed to imply the state interpretation, [UNSHARE] : 〈P 〉V P
This ghost move allows us to convert a shareable assertion back to its previous
form (where resources were held in the local part instead of the shareable part). The
assertion P1 in the [RELAXED−STORE] rule is used to reduce the possible intermediate
environment moves we need to consider.
A release fence marks resources that are ready to be shared. Our [RELEASE−FENCE]
rule shows that an assertion P in its precondition is transformed into a shareable as-
sertion after the fence (assuming it is possible to do so). The sanity check in the
premise prevents false from being gained in the postcondition. Note that if the pre-
condition P is already a shareable assertion or a waiting-to-be-acquired assertion (i.e.
〈P 〉 ⇒ false), the release-fence would act like the skip action, and the postcondition
would remain as P (according to the frame rule in Separation Logic).
For atomic loads, the [ACQUIRE−LOAD] rule in GPS is compatible with our new
setting. Note that the knowledge it retrieves from its load source is directly put in
the postcondition. However as we have discussed, the knowledge gained by a relaxed
GPS+ : Reasoning about Fences and Relaxed Atomics 13
load should not be considered as immediately available to the current thread (for
reading, updating or re-transmitting). Therefore, in our new [RELAXED−LOAD] rule,
the knowledge Q the load gains is marked as waiting-to-be-acquired knowledge
Q in its post condition. One can then use the [ACQUIRE−FENCE] rule to turn an
acquirable knowledge into a normal one.
CAS(`, vo, v) (compare and swap) is an important synchronisation operation, which
is widely used in various lock algorithms. It performs the following things in one
atomic step: firstly it loads from `, and compares the value it gets with the expected
value vo; if they are equal, it updates ` with a new value v and returns 1 indicating
its success, otherwise returns 0. The CAS in our [CAS] rule is a release-acquire CAS,
i.e. in the case of success (corresponding to the first premise) it behaves like a release
store, and in the case of fail (corresponding to the second premise) it behaves like an
acquire load that read some value other than vo. Moreover, in the case of success, it
can retrieve non-knowledge assertions from the interpretation of the state s′. As we
require that all state interpretations must be normal assertions (or false), we do not
need to be concerned that improper assertions, like shareable assertions that can be
immediately re-transmitted by any following relaxed stores without a release fence,
will be retrieved from τ(s′, vo) and left over in Q.
5 Illustrative Example
We illustrate our reasoning logic using the racy program shown in Fig 13. We first
show how our logic can detect the data race and how it is unable to prove the program
to be correct. We then show that after resolving the race by properly adding fences,
our logic can prove it successfully.
Note that a message x ↪→ 1 is created in thread 1, and is passed to thread 2 by the
release store to y. Thread 2 performs a relaxed store to z, intending to retransmit this
message to thread 3, where the ownership of x is demanded to perform the non-atomic
write.
According to the C11 standard, this program contains a data race as it is not prop-
erly synchronised. Despite the fact that in thread 1 the store operation to y is release
atomic, the load operation in thread 2 that reads from it is relaxed. Without a sub-
sequent acquire fence, no synchronisation can be established between thread 1 and
2. Similarly, though the acquire load operation of z in thread 3 reads from the store
operation in thread 2, the two threads are not synchronised as the store operation is
relaxed and lacking a release fence before it. Therefore, the chain of happens be-
let x = alloc(1) in
let y = alloc(1) in
let z = alloc(1) in
[x]na := 0; [y]rel := 0; [z]rel := 0;
[x]na := 1; repeat [y]rlx end; repeat [z]acq end;
[y]rel := 1; [z]rlx := 1; [x]na := 2
Fig. 13: A program with a data race
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(0.1) {true}
x = alloc(1); y = alloc(1); z = alloc(1);
[x]na := 0; [y]rel := 0; [z]rel := 0;
(0.2)
{
x ↪→ 0 ∗ y : 0 Prot(y) ∗ z : 0 Prot(z)
}
(0.3)
{
x ↪→ 0 ∗ y : 0 Prot(y) ∗ z : 0 Prot(z) ∗
∃γ. γ : 
}
(1.1){
x ↪→ 0 ∗
y : 0 Prot(y)
}
[x]na := 1;
(1.2){
x ↪→ 1 ∗
y : 0 Prot(y)
}
(1.3){
[XE] ∗
y : 0 Prot(y)
}
[y]rel := 1;
(1.4){
y : 1 Prot(y)
}
(2.1){
y : 0 Prot(y) ∗
z : 0 Prot(z)
}
repeat [y]rlx end;
(2.2)
[XE] ∗
y : 1 Prot(y) ∗
z : 0 Prot(z)

(2.3)
// Expectation :
〈[XE]〉 ∗
z : 0 Prot(z)

// (2.2) 0 (2.3):
// Verification failed!
[z]rlx := 1;
(3.1){
z : 0 Prot(z) ∗
γ : 
}
repeat [z]acq end;
(3.2){
z : 1 Prot(z) ∗
[XE] ∗ γ : 
}
(3.3){
z : 1 Prot(z) ∗
x ↪→ 1
}
[x]na := 2
(3.4){
z : 1 Prot(z) ∗
x ↪→ 2
}
(a) Failed verification of the racy program
(2.1′)
{
y : 0 Prot(y) ∗
z : 0 Prot(z)
}
repeat [y]rlx end;
(2.2′)

[XE] ∗
y : 1 Prot(y) ∗
z : 0 Prot(z)

fenceacq;
(2.3′)

[XE] ∗
y : 1 Prot(y) ∗
z : 0 Prot(z)

fencerel;
(2.4′)

〈[XE]〉 ∗
y : 1 Prot(y) ∗
z : 0 Prot(z)

[z]rlx := 1;
(2.5′)
{
y : 1 Prot(y) ∗
z : 1 Prot(z)
}
(b) Verifying the fixed thread 2
Fig. 14: Verification of Relayed Message Passing
fore (hb) relation breaks between thread 1 and 3. Without having a happens before
relation, the non-atomic writes to x in thread 1 and 3 produce a data race.
We show in Fig 14a that, with the help of the two new types of assertions, our
logic can detect the failure of synchronisation, and will not prove the racy program
to be correct. First, we define the escrow for x and protocols for y and z, where each
of y and z has only two protocol states 0 and 1, and 0 vProt(l) 1 for l∈{y, z}:
XE : γ :   x ↪→ 1, Prot(`)(0, v) , v=0 Prot(`)(1, v) , v=1∧[XE] `∈{y, z}
As shown in Fig. 14a, the verification could not be finished in thread 2. Even
though in thread 1 the message about x is packed via ghost move from (1.2) to
(1.3), and put into y’s state interpretation as knowledge, the relaxed load opera-
tion of y in thread 2 can only extract the knowledge in a waiting-to-be-acquired
form [XE] according to [RELAXED−LOAD]. Without subsequent acquire and release
fences, this waiting-to-be-acquired knowledge is kept in this form and cannot be used
to entail the required precondition for the next command [z]rlx := 1, in which the
packed escrow is expected to be in the shareable form 〈[XE]〉 according to the rule
[RELAXED−STORE].
To resolve the data race in this program, as shown in Fig 14b, an acquire fence and
a release fence are needed to be inserted between the relaxed load operation of y and
the release operation to z in thread 2, which will change the waiting-to-be-acquired
knowledge into normal knowledge and then shareable knowledge before the relaxed
store operation to z transfers it to thread 3.
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It is worth noting that our logic supports modular reasoning. The verification of
thread 1 and 3 can be conducted separately despite the error in the original thread 2.
We have also applied our reasoning logic to a number of more challenging pro-
grams as documented in the appendix.
6 Resource Model
Under weak memory models, it is difficult to assume a sequentially-consistent global
heap. Instead, resources are used in GPS to logically represent the computation states.
In this section we shall first briefly introduce the GPS resource model and then present
our new resource model which is built on the GPS one.
6.1 GPS Resources
Instead of assuming a sequentially-consistent global heap, GPS makes use of re-
sources to logically represent computation states. A resource r ∈ Resource is a triple
(Π, g,Σ) where the physical location map Π maps each location to either a value (for
non-atomics) or a protocol and state (for atomics), the ghost identity map g keeps the
ghost values, and the known escrow set Σ contains all escrows available. Resources
form a PCM with composition ⊕. Some useful definitions are:
emp , ((λn. ⊥), (λµ. λn. εµ),∅) r ≤ r′ , ∃r′′. r ⊕ r′′ = r′ r#r′ , r ⊕ r′defined
Each proposition P in GPS is interpreted as a set of resources, i.e. JP Kρ ⊆ Resource,
where ρ is a term interpretation we assumed for state and PCM terms. Moreover, the
interpretation satisfies the following property: ∀r ∈ JP Kρ. ∀r′#r. r ⊕ r′ ∈ JP Kρ
GPS also introduces a rely-guarantee-styled instrumented semantics for all ac-
tions. Let us take the release store operation as an example. Given a resource rpre
that meets the pre-condition of the write, and assuming resource r is the actual re-
source used by the write (note r can be different from rpre as the environment may
also make changes prior to the write), the effect of this atomic write can be illus-
trated by its guarantee definition as shown below, where rsb is the resource that will
be passed down to its sb successor in the execution graph and rrf is the resource to be
transmitted to its reader:
(rsb, rrf) ∈ guar(rpre, r,W(l, V, rel)) if
∃τ, s, S.rrf ∈ interp(τ)(s, V ) ∧ rrf ⊕ rsb = r[` := at(τ, S ∪ {s})] ∧ rsb[`] = rrf [`]
∧(r[`] = uninit ∧ S = ∅ ∨ r[`] = at(τ, S) ∧ ∀s0 ∈ S. s0 vτ s)
∧∀rE .
(
∃τ, s′, V ′. rE ∈ interp(τ)(s′, V ′) ∧ rpre#rE
∧ rpre[`] vat RE [`] ≡at at(τ, S ∪ {s′})
)
⇒ rE [`] vat rrf [`]
Note that interp(τ)(s, V ) denotes the semantics of the state interpretation under the
new state s, namely Jτ(s, V )Kρ, which carries the information we intend to transmit
through this atomic write. The notation r[`] is short for r.Π(`), which is the value of
the physical location `. For an atomic location, this is an atomic protocol value in the
form of at(τ, S), where τ is the protocol type governing that location and S is a trace
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of states the location has gone through. Some relations between these protocol values
are defined as:
at(τ, S) vτ at(τ, S′) , ∀s ∈ S. ∃s′ ∈ S′. s vτ s′ π ≡at π′ , π vτ π′ ∧ π′ vτ π
The assertion-level ghost move is defined in terms of resource-level ghost moves:
ρ |= P V Q , ∀r ∈ JP Kρ. r V JQKρ
For instance, the escrow packing rule is validated by the following resource-level
ghost move:
interp(σ) = (JP Kρ, JP ′Kρ) r′ ∈ JP ′Kρ
(Π, g,Σ)⊕ r′ V b(Π, g,Σ ∪ {σ})c
Note that the escrow’s interpretation interp(σ) = (JP Kρ, JP ′Kρ). Note also that brc is
defined as {r ⊕ r′ | r′ ∈ Resource}.
6.2 The New Resource Model
To deal with the two new types of assertions, we extend the GPS resource model to a
more expressive one by lifting resources to resource triples:
ResTriple , {(r1, r2, r3) | r1, r2, r3 ∈ Resource ∧ r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ r3 defined}
For each resource triple R = (r1, r2, r3) we use R[L] to denote r1,R[S] for r2, and R[A]
for r3, representing resp. its local, shareable, and waiting-to-be-acquired component.
Like resources, ResTriple also forms a PCM. The composition operation ⊕ is
defined point-wise; the compatibility can be defined as: R#R′ , R⊕R′ defined. EMP
is defined as a resource triple comprising only empty resources: EMP , (emp, emp, emp).
The semantics for propositions is lifted to the ResTriple model as well. The inter-
pretation JP Kρ of an assertion P is a set of resource triples satisfying the property:
∀R ∈ JP Kρ. ∀R′#R.R⊕R′ ∈ JP Kρ
For any basic assertion P and resource triple R , only the local part of R is needed
when checkingR∈JP Kρ. For example,R ∈ J ` : s τ Kρ ⇔ ∃S.R[L].Π(`) = at(τ, S) ∧ s ∈ S
Composed assertions like separating conjunction are directly lifted up to use re-
source triples: R ∈ JP1 ∗ P2Kρ ⇔ ∃R1,R2.R = R1 ⊕R2 ∧R1 ∈ JP1Kρ ∧R2 ∈ JP2Kρ.
The semantics for synchronisation related assertions, namely knowledge, share-
able assertion and waiting-to-be-acquired assertions are defined as:
R ∈ JP Kρ ⇔ |(R[L], emp, emp)| ∈ JP Kρ
R ∈ J〈P 〉Kρ ⇔ (R[S], emp, emp) ∈ JP Kρ
R ∈ JP Kρ ⇔ (R[A], emp, emp) ∈ JP Kρ
Note the stripping |R| is a lifted version of the GPS stripping, i.e.
|(r1, r2, r3)| , (|r1|, |r2|, |r3|). 3
3 In GPS, |r| represents the duplicable part of r: r = r ⊕ |r|. For duplicable items in r, like atomic
values and the known escrow set, stripping keeps them unchanged. That is, we have |r|.Σ = r.Σ, and if
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Under the new resource model, the following properties hold. Note properties for
knowledge that hold in GPS are all preserved in the new model but are omitted here.
〈P 〉 ⇒ false if EMP6∈JP Kρ 〈P 〉 ⇒ false if EMP6∈JP Kρ 〈P 〉 ∗ 〈Q〉 ⇔ 〈P ∗Q〉
〈P 〉 ⇒ false if EMP6∈JP Kρ   P ⇒ false if EMP6∈JP Kρ P ⇔ P ∗ P
  P ⇒ false if EMP6∈JP Kρ 〈〈P 〉〉 ⇒ false if EMP6∈JP Kρ
6.2.1 Ghost Moves
As in GPS, assertion-level ghost moves are defined in terms of resource-level ghost
moves: ρ |= P V Q , ∀R ∈ JP Kρ.RV JQKρ. The only difference is that resource triples
are now used in the resource level. For instance, the resource level escrow packing
ghost move is changed to:
interp(σ) = (JP Kρ, JP ′Kρ) R′ ∈ JP ′Kρ R[L] = (Π, g,Σ)
R⊕R′ V b((Π, g,Σ ∪ {σ}),R[S],R[A])c
Based on this definition, we can obtain the same escrow packing rule as that in GPS.
In addition to all ghost moves inherited from GPS, we also propose a new one:
R′[L] = R[L]⊕ r R′[S]⊕ r = R[S] R′[A] = R[A]
RV bR′c
This resource-level ghost move gives us the assertion-level ghost move rule [UNSHARE]
(shown in §4).
6.2.2 Rely/Guarantee Definitions
Following the GPS approach, we define the instrumented semantics for all actions
in the rely/guarantee style. But instead of manipulating resources, our actions work
on resource triples, which is more expressive and allows us to describe the subtle
difference among various kinds of actions. As an example, the guarantee definitions
for release and relaxed writes are illustrated in Fig. 15.
Note that a release write can move a resource (r2) from the triple’s local part R[L]
to the shareable part R[S] and transmit it to the readers, while the relaxed write can
only transmit the resource already in the shareable component.
The full rely and guarantee conditions for GPS+’s extended set of actions in Fig.
16 and Fig. 17 with the following shorthand definitions:
Rrf ∈ envMove(R, l, V ) , ∃τ, s. (Rrf [S], emp, emp) ∈ interp(τ)(s, V )
∧ R#Rrf ∧R[L][`] vτ Rrf [S][`] ≡at at(τ, {s})
`at is an atomic location in r we have |r|.Π(`at) = r.Π(`at). For non-duplicable items, like non-atomic
values, stripping removes them. For example, if `na is a non-atomic location in r we have |r|.Π(`na) = ⊥.
The value  of ghost type Tok is also not duplicable, and all ghost locations of type Tok will be set as
empty after stripping: |r|.g(Tok)(−) = ξ.
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(Rsb,Rrf) ∈ guar(Rpre,R,W(`, V, rel)) if (Rsb,Rrf) ∈ guar(Rpre,R,W(`, V, rlx)) if
∃τ, s, S,R′, rrf . ∃τ, s, S,R′, rrf .
∃r1, r2.R′[A] = R[A]
∧ R[L] = r1 ⊕ r2 ∧ r2 ≤ rrf
∧R′[L] = r1[` := at(τ, S ∪ {s})]
∧ R′[S] = R[S]⊕ r2[` := at(τ, S ∪ {s})]


R′[A] = R[A]
∧ R′[L] = R[L][` := at(τ, S ∪ {s})]
∧ R′[S] = R[S][` := at(τ, S ∪ {s})]

∧ (rrf , emp, emp) ∈ interp(τ)(s, V ) ∧ (rrf , emp, emp) ∈ interp(τ)(s, V )
∧Rrf = (emp, rrf , emp) ∧Rrf = (emp, rrf , emp)
∧ Rrf ⊕Rsb = R′ ∧ Rrf ⊕Rsb = R′
. . . . . .
(a) New guarantee condition for release write (b) Guarantee condition for relaxed write
Fig. 15: Guarantee conditions for release write vs relaxed write
These conditions describe the effect of actions. A rely condition rely(R, α) for ac-
tion α, denoting a set of resource triples, signifies what the action expects from its
incoming resource triples, where R represents α’s precondition, and Rrely represents
the resource triples after taking possible environment moves under consideration. A
guarantee condition guar(Rpre,R, α) signifies that α guarantees to produce pairs of re-
source triples (Rsb,Rrf), in which Rsb is left for its sb successors and Rrf is for its
potential readers.
α Rrely Rrely ∈ rely(R, α) if
R(l, V, na) R R[L][`] = na(V ′)⇒ V = V ′
R(l, V, rlx) R′ ∃Rrf .R[L][`] = at(−)⇒Rrf ∈ envMove(R, `, V )
∧ R′[S] = R[S] ∧R′[A] = R[A]⊕ |Rrf [S]|
∧ R′[L] = R[L][ ` :=Rrf [S][`] ]
R(l, V, acq) R′ ∃Rrf .R[L][`] = at(−)⇒Rrf ∈ envMove(R, `, V )
∧ ∀n 6= L.R′(n) = R(n) ∧R′[L] = R[L]⊕ |Rrf [S]|
W(l, V, at) R R[L][`] = at(−)⇒ ∃V ′. envMove(R, `, V ′) 6= ∅
U(l, V, V ′) R′ ∃Rrf .R[L][`] = at(−)⇒Rrf ∈ envMove(R, `, V )
∧ ∀n 6= L.R′(n) = R(n) ∧R′[L] = R[L]⊕Rrf [S]
otherwise R always
Fig. 16: Rely conditions for actions
Note that the possible states for a physical location are uninit for uninitialised,
na(V ) for a non-atomic location holding value V , at(τ, S) for an atomic location fol-
lowing protocol τ with a trace of state changes recorded in S, and ⊥ for empty.
7 Soundness
We formulate the soundness of our proposed program logic in this section. As in GPS,
our reasoning is compositional, i.e. triples about each program are proved separately
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α (Rsb,Rrf) ∈ guar(Rpre,R, α) if
S Rrf = EMP ∧Rsb = R
A(`..`′) Rrf = EMP ∧ ∀n 6= L.Rsb(n) = R(n) ∧R[L] = R[L][`..`′ := uninit]
R(`, V, na) Rrf = EMP ∧Rsb = R∧R[L] = na(−)
R(`, V, at) Rrf = EMP ∧Rsb = R∧R[L] = at(−)
W(`, V, na) Rrf = EMP ∧R[L][`] ∈ {uninit, na(−)} ∧
∀n 6= L.Rsb(n) = R(n) ∧Rsb[L] = R[L][ ` := na(V ) ]
W(`, V, rlx) ∃τ, s, S,R′, rrf .(
R′[A] = R[A] ∧R′[L] = R[L][` := at(τ, S ∪ {s})]
∧ R′[S] = R[S][` := at(τ, S ∪ {s})]
)
∧ (rrf , emp, emp) ∈ interp(τ)(s, V ) ∧Rrf = (emp, rrf , emp)
∧ Rrf ⊕Rsb = R′ ∧Rpre[L][`] 6= ⊥
∧ (R[L][`] = uninit ∧ S=∅ ∨R[L][`] = at(τ, S) ∧ ∀s0 ∈ S. s0 vτ s)
∧ ∀RE ∈ envMove(Rpre, `,−).RE [S][`] vat Rrf [S][`]
W(`, V, rel) ∃τ, s, S,R′, rrf . ∃r1, r2.R′[A] = R[A] ∧R[L] = r1 ⊕ r2 ∧ r2 ≤ rrf∧ R′[L] = r1[` := at(τ, S ∪ {s})]
∧ R′[S] = R[S]⊕ r2[` := at(τ, S ∪ {s})]

∧ (rrf , emp, emp) ∈ interp(τ)(s, V ) ∧Rrf = (emp, rrf , emp)
∧ Rrf ⊕Rsb = R′ ∧Rpre[L][`] 6= ⊥
∧ (R[L][`] = uninit ∧ S=∅ ∨R[L][`] = at(τ, S) ∧ ∀s0 ∈ S. s0 vτ s)
∧ ∀RE ∈ envMove(Rpre, `,−).RE [S][`] vat Rrf [S][`]
U(`, V, V ′) ∃τ, s, S,R′, rrf . ∃r1, r2.R′[A] = R[A] ∧R[L] = r1 ⊕ r2 ∧ r2 ≤ rrf∧ R′[L] = r1[` := at(τ, S ∪ {s})]
∧ R′[S] = R[S]⊕ r2[` := at(τ, S ∪ {s})]

∧ (rrf , emp, emp) ∈ interp(τ)(s, V ) ∧Rrf = (emp, rrf , emp)
∧ Rrf ⊕Rsb = R′ ∧Rpre[L][`] 6= ⊥
∧ (R[L][`] = uninit ∧ S=∅ ∨R[L][`] = at(τ, S) ∧ ∀s0 ∈ S. s0 vτ s)
F(rel) Rrf = EMP ∧Rsb[A] = R[A] ∧Rsb[L]⊕Rsb[S] = R[L]⊕R[S]
F(acq) Rrf = EMP ∧ ∃r, r′.R[A] = r ⊕ r′
∧ Rsb[A] = r ∧Rsb[L] = r′ ⊕R[L] ∧Rsb[S] = R[S]
Fig. 17: Guarantee conditions for actions
and then linked together using the let and fork rules. To bridge the gap between such
local reasoning and the underlying global semantics, similar to GPS, we formulate
the notion of local safety and global safety, so as to demonstrate the soundness of the
proposed reasoning system.
7.1 Local Safety
Based on rely-guarantee reasoning [12,25], the local safety for a thread says that the
actions the thread controls confirm to their guarantees, assuming actions the environ-
ment controls respect their rely conditions, as similarly shown in GPS. However our
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proof is different from GPS’s as our rely/guarantee definitions are based on resource
triples to cover more actions and capture the subtle differences between them.
Using the rely and guarantee definitions, LSafen(e, Φ) is defined as the set of re-
source triples on which command e can safely execute for n steps and end up with
postcondition Φ, which is a mapping from value to proposition interpretation, being
satisfied:
R ∈ LSafe0(e, Φ) , always
R ∈ LSafen+1(e, Φ) ,
If e ∈ Val thenR ∈ JΦ(e)Kρ
If e = K[fork e′] thenR ∈ LSafen(K[0], Φ) ∗ LSafen(e′, true)
If e α−→ e′ then ∀RF#R. ∀Rpre ∈ rely(R⊕RF , α).
∃P ′.Rpre ∈ JP ′Kρ ∧ ∀R′ ∈ JP ′Kρ. (Rpre,R′) ∈ wpe(α)
=⇒ ∃Rpost. (Rpost ⊕RF ,−) ∈ guar(Rpre,R′, α) ∧Rpost ∈ LSafen(e′, Φ)
Note that the expression e is actually executed with the state R′, taking into account
the possible interference from environment as long as it respects the rely condition
for α. Note also the wpe is a sanity check, ensuring some obvious faults will not occur
like re-allocating some locations, which is defined as:
α (Rpre,R′) ∈ wpe(α) if
A(`1..`n) ∀i. 1 ≤ i ≤ n⇒R′(`i) = ⊥
W(`,−, at) Rpre[L][`] = at(−) ∧R′[L][`] = at(−)
⇒ ∃RE ∈ envMove(Rpre, `,−).RE [L][`] = R′[L][`]
U(`,−,−) Rpre[L][`] = at(−)⇒R′[L][`] ≡ Rpre[L][`]
As in GPS, we define local soundness (with respect to the semantics for a Hoare
triple) as: ρ  {P} e {x.Q} , ∀n,R ∈ JP Kρ.R ∈ LSafen(e, Jx.QKρ).
Intuitively it says given any state R that satisfies the precondition P , the expression
e is safe to execute as many steps as possible and we can expect when it terminates
with return value v, Q[v/x] holds, where x is a place holder for the return value in Q
and can be omitted if Q does not describe the return value.
Theorem 1 (local soundness) . Our verification logic (presented in sec 4) is locally
sound. That is, if {P} e {x.Q} is provable, then for all closing ρwe have ρ  {P} e {x.Q}.
Proof This theorem can be proved by using structural induction on e. Base cases,
including all the new verification rules in Fig. 12, are proved by using the last entry
of LSafe1 and check it with their rely and guarantee definitions. Then programs are
linked using let-binding (including fork). ut
7.2 Global Safety and the Final Soundness Theorem
Same as GPS our logic is for concurrent programs, in its soundness proof, besides
showing the inference rules are valid according to the semantics of triples, we also
need to show if a triple {P}e{x.Q} holds e does not contain any data races, memory
errors, nor dangling reads. However GPS+ allows relaxed operations, which means
unlike that in GPS, our rf relations do not ensure hb relations. That means to prove
properties like data-race free becomes much trickier.
To formally discuss global soundness, we first give following definitions: In an
execution graph, two events are conflicting if they both access a same location while
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at least one of them is a write action, and at least one of them is non-atomic. A graph
G contains data race, written as dataRace(G), if there is at least one pair of conflicting
accesses a and b, and we have ¬hb(a, b) ∧ ¬hb(b, a). We say a graph G contains memory
error, written as memErr(G), if there exists an event a that accesses the location l, but
there does not exist an event that happens before a and allocates the location l. We
say in a graph G has initialised reads written as initReads(G), if for every read event in
G, there is a write event accesses the same location and happens before it.
Then we define the execution and the result of a program e using the machine step
semantics defined in §2.
execs(e) , {(e′, G) | 〈[i 7→ (start, e)]; ([start 7→ S],∅,∅,∅)〉 −→∗ 〈[i 7→ (−, e′) ] T ];G〉}
JeK ,
{
error ∃(−, G) ∈ execs(e). dataRace(G) ∨memErr(G)
{V | (V,−) ∈ execs(e)} otherwise
With the semantics for a program e defined, we can formulate the global sound-
ness as: if ` {true} e {x.P} then JeK ⊆ {V | JP [V/x]K 6= ∅}, which ensures that Hoare triples
proved in the proposed system accurately predict the final result of a closed program,
according to the C11 memory model. To prove this, we introduce the notion of global
safety based on a global event graph G.
GSafen(T , G,L) ,
valid(G,L, N) = N ∧ compat(G,L) ∧ conform(G,L, N)∧
∀a ∈ N. L(sb, a,⊥) =⊕{R | ∃i. T (i) = (a,−,R,−)}∧
∀i. T (i) = (a, e,R, Φ) =⇒R ∈ LSafen(e, Φ)
where N , dom(G.A)
The L is a labeling map that associates the graph’s edges with the resource triples
passed through. The T ∈ IThreadMap , {N→ (a, e,R, Φ)} is an instrumented thread
pool. It maps each thread to a tuple (a, e,R, Φ), where a is a thread’s last event in the
graph, e is the thread’s continuation, R is the resource triple it currently owns, and its
postcondition is described by Φ. A instrumented thread pool can be down casted to a
machine thread pool T using erase(T ), where ∀i. T = (a, e,R, Φ)⇒ erase(T )(i) = (a, e).
The valid(G,L, dom(G.A)) is the set of properly labeled nodes. Being equal with
dom(G.A), it ensures that all nodes are labeled properly. The compat(G) asserts
any set of hb-independent edges in G, the sum of the resource triples they carry is
defined. We say a set of edges T hb-independent if for all edges (a, a′), (b, b′) ∈ T we
have ¬hb=(a′, b). The conform checks the state transitions for atomic writes respect
the mo order[23].
Intuitively, the GSafen(T , G,L) states from a graph G and with the resource triples
given in L, any thread from T is safe to execute under the global context up to n
steps. We would like to ensure the GSafe property holds during the program execution
and the growth of the graph, until there is nothing to be executed. Therefore we first
introduce our way to do the labeling after a new node is added to the graph (an action
is executed), and use five lemmas (whose proofs are left in report [10]) to demonstrate
that the properties required for GSafe will be restored after labels are added for a new
node.
When a new node b is added to the graph, we first label its sb incoming edge.
Suppose b’s sb predecessor is a (if b is the first event of the execution, its sb predeces-
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sor is a S node with empty resource triples on the outgoing edges), a’s sb outgoing
resource triple initially goes into a sink edge sb(a,⊥). If b is the first event in a forked
thread, we take R from the sink edge and label sb(a, b) with it, leaving Rrem for a’s
local thread; otherwise, we take everything to label sb(a, b) leaving Rrem empty. By
labeling the new sb edge in this way, the following lemma can be proved.
Lemma 1 (Step Preparation) .
if consistentC11(G) then ∃L′. dom(G.A) = valid(G′,L′, dom(G.A))
∧consistentC11(G′) ∧compat(G′,L′)
∧dom(G′, A) = dom(G.A) ] b ∧conform(G′,L′, dom(G′.A))
∧L(sb, a,⊥) = R⊕Rrem ∧L′(sb, a,⊥) = Rrem
∧dom(G.A) ⊆ valid(G,L, dom(G.A)) ∧in(L′, b, sb) = R
∧compat(G,L) ∧ conform(G,L, N) ∧in(L′, b, rf) = EMP
∧∀c ∈ dom(G.A). G.A(c) = G′.A(c) ∧in(L′, b, esc) = EMP
∧G′.sb = G.sb ] [a, b) ∧∀a′ 6= a. L′(sb, a′, b) = EMP
∧∀c ∈ dom(G.A). G.rf(c) = G′.rf(c) ∧out(L′, b, all) = EMP
∧G′.mo ⊇ G.mo ∧∀a′ 6= a. L′(sb, a′,⊥) = L(sb, a′,⊥)
Note that the in(L, a, t) and out(L, a, t) are used to represent the sum of resource
triples on a’s incoming or outgoing edges with type t.
Then we label the rf incoming edge. Note that this labeling is for atomic read ac-
tions only (including CAS). A non-atomic load reads from local resource triple carried
in by sb incoming edge. But an atomic load can read from any writer to the same
location as long as the consistentC11 holds. A writer’s outgoing rf resource triple, in
the form of (emp, r, emp), initially goes to its rf sink edge. If the newly added read event
reads from it, we label the rf edge between them in three different manners accord-
ing to the reader’s type. If the reader is relaxed (relaxed atomic read or failed CAS),
we label its rf incoming edge using a resource triple (emp, emp, |r|); if it is an acquire
read, we label its rf incoming edge using (|r|, emp, emp); and if it is an update read (suc-
cessful CAS), we shall use (r, emp, emp) and change the label of writer’s rf sink edge to
(emp, |r|, emp). This process gives us the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Rely Step) .
if G.A(a) = α then ∃L′. N ⊆ valid(G,L′, N)
∧dom(G.A) = N ] a ∧compat(G,L)
∧N ∈ prefix(G) ∧N ⊆ valid(G,L, N) ∧conform(G,L, N)
∧in(L, a, all) = out(L, a, all) = EMP ∧in(L′, a, sb)⊕ in(L′, a, rf)
∧compat(G,L) ∧ conform(G,L, N) ∈ rely(in(L′, a, sb), α)
∧consistentC11(G) ∧in(L′, a, esc) = out(L′, a, all) = EMP
∧in(L, a, rf) = EMP ∧ in(L, a, esc) = EMP ∧∀b, c. L′(sb, b, c) = L(sb, b, c)
∧out(L, a, all) = EMP ∧∀b. L′(sb, b,⊥) = L(sb, b,⊥)
Next we consider the resource transfer via ghost moves (essentially creating and
redeeming of escrows). Given an escrow defined as σ : P  P ′ and a node a owns
resource triple (rrem ⊕ resc,−,−) where (resc, emp, emp) ∈ JP ′K. We can put (resc, emp, emp)
under escrow, i.e. move it to a’s esc sink edge and add σ to rrem’s known escrow set.
On the other hand, if a node b owns resource triple (r ⊕ rcond,−,−), where
σ ∈ r.Π ∧ (rcond, emp, emp) ∈ JP K. It can consume the escrow condition rcond by disposing
it to b’s cond sink edge and redeem the resource triple under escrow by moving it from
a’s esc sink edge to edge esc(a, b). In the following lemmas we check the ghost moves
are correct and the labeling so far satisfies new action’s wpe.
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Lemma 3 (Ghost Step) .
if dom(G.A) = N ] a ∧N ∈ prefix(G) ∧N ⊆ valid(G,L, dom(G.A))
∧compat(G,L[(esc,−, a,⊥) := L(esc,−, a,⊥)⊕R])
∧conform(G,L, N) ∧ consistentC11(G)
∧Rbefore , in(L, a, sb)⊕ in(L, a, rf)⊕ in(L, a, esc)
∧Rafter , R⊕ out(L, a, esc)⊕ out(L, a, cond)
∧Rbefore VI Rafter ∧ |Rbefore| ≤ R ∧RV P ∧ ∀c. L(esc,−, a, e) = EMP
∧∀(σ,RE) ∈ I. interp(σ) = (Q,Q′)⇒RE ∈ Q′
∧L(esc, a,⊥) =⊕
{
RE
∣∣∣∣ (σ,RE) ∈ I, interp(σ) = (Q,Q′),RE ∈ Q′,(6 ∃b. hb=(a, b) ∧ L(cond, b,⊥) ∈ Q)
}
then ∃L′, I′,R′,R′before,R
′
after ∈ P.
N ⊆ valid(G,L′, dom(G.A))
∧compat(G,L′[(esc,−, a,⊥) := L′(esc,−, a,⊥)⊕R′])
∧conform(G,L′, N)
∧R′before , in(L
′, a, sb)⊕ in(L′, a, rf)⊕ in(L′, a, esc)
∧R′after , R
′ ⊕ out(L′, a, esc)⊕ out(L, a, cond) ∧R′before VI′ I
′R′after
∧∀b. L′(sb, b,⊥) = L(sb, b,⊥) ∧ ∀b. L′(rf, b,⊥) = L(rf, b,⊥)
∧∀b, c. L′(sb, b, c) = L(sb, b, c) ∧ ∀b, c. L′(rf, b, c) = L(rf, b, c)
∧∀c. L′(esc,−, a, e) = EMP ∧ ∀(σ,RE) ∈ I′. interp(σ) = (Q,Q′)⇒RE ∈ Q′
∧L(esc, a,⊥) =⊕
{
RE
∣∣∣∣ (σ,RE) ∈ I′, interp(σ) = (Q,Q′),RE ∈ Q′,(6 ∃b. hb=(a, b) ∧ L(cond, b,⊥) ∈ Q)
}
Lemma 4 (Protocol Equivalence for Writes) .
if dom(G.A) = N ] a ∧N ∈ prefix(G) ∧N ⊆ valid(G,L, dom(G.A))
∧compat(G,L[(esc,−, a,⊥) := L(esc,−, a,⊥)⊕R])
∧conform(G,L, N) ∧ consistentC11(G)
∧in(L, a, all)VI R⊕ out(L, a, esc)⊕ out(L, a, cond)
∧|in(L, a, sb)⊕ in(L, a, rf)| ≤ R
then (in(L, a, sb)⊕ in(L, a, rf), in(L, a, all)) ∈ wpe(G.A(a))
Finally in guarantee step, we label a node’s outgoing sb and rf edges using the cor-
responding resource triples generated according to the action’s guarantee definition.
Initially these resource triples go to sink nodes, until their future sb or rf successors
are added to the graph and take them to label the corresponding edges.
Lemma 5 (Guarantee Step) .
if G.A(a) = α ∧ dom(G.A) = N ] a ∧N ∈ prefix(G) ∧N ⊆ valid(G,L, dom(G.A))
∧compat(G,L[(esc,−, a,⊥) := L(esc,−, a,⊥)⊕R])
∧conform(G,L, N) ∧ consistentC11(G)
∧Rpre = in(L, a, sb)⊕ in(L, a, rf)
∧in(L, a, all)VI R⊕ out(L, a, esc)⊕ out(L, a, cond)
∧Rpre ∈ rely(−, α) ∧ |in(L, a, all)| ≤ R
∧∀(σ,RE) ∈ I. interp(σ) = (Q,Q′)⇒RE ∈ Q′
∧L(esc, a,⊥) =⊕
{
RE
∣∣∣∣ (σ,RE) ∈ I, interp(σ) = (Q,Q′),RE ∈ Q′,(6 ∃b. hb=(a, b) ∧ L(cond, b,⊥) ∈ Q)
}
∧out(L, a, sb) = out(L, a, rf) = EMP
∧(Rsb,Rrf) ∈ guar(Rpre,R, α) ∧ wpe(α,Rpre, in(L, a, all))
then ∃L′.
∧dom(G.A) = valid(G,L′, dom(G.A))
∧compat(G,L′) ∧ conform(G,L′, dom(G.A))
∧∀b 6= a. L′(sb, b,⊥) = L(sb, b,⊥) ∧ L′(sb, a,⊥) = Rsb
The proofs for the above-mentioned five lemmas are left in report [10]. We now
present the Theorem Instrumented Execution, which says that given a program and
24 Mengda He et al.
graph configuration that is globally safe for n+1 steps, any legal machine step (sched-
uled arbitrarily) will transform it into a new configuration that is globally safe for n
steps.
Theorem 2 (Instrumented Execution) .
If GSafen+1(T , G,L) ∧ 〈erase(T );G〉 −→ 〈T ′;G′〉
then ∃T ′,L′. erase(T ′) = T ′ ∧ GSafen(T ′, G′,L′).
Proof Starting from GSafen+1(T , G,L), a machine step will tranform the graph into
G′ and thread pool into T ′, leaving LSafen for the thread that takes the move. By ap-
plying the labeling lemmas, Lemma 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 consecutively to the graph G′ with
the newly added node, we can find a new labeling L′ and establish the valid, compat,
and conform along with other properties for the new graph and labeling. Therefore,
the new graph is GSafen(T ′, G′,L′). ut
In what follows we present one more lemma, whose proof is left in report [10].
Lemma 6 (Error Free) . If GSafen(T , G,L) then we have ¬dataRace(G),¬memErr(G),
and all reads are initialised.
Finally we move on to the global soundness theorem Adequacy.
Theorem 3 (Adequacy) . If ` {true} e {x.P} then JeK ⊆ {V | JP [V/x]K 6= ∅}.
Proof Firstly, given the triple is syntactically sound, we know starting with its
precondition true, it is LSafe for any number of steps. As we are only interested in
partical correctness, we assume the program terminates within n steps, i.e. after n
steps, e is transformed into a pure value V and all its children threads terminate too.
We can assert LSafen+1(e, Jx.P K), and construct
GSafen+1
(
[0 7→ (start, e, emp, Jx.P K)], ([start 7→ S],∅,∅,∅),
[(sb, start,⊥) 7→ EMP] ] [(rf, start,⊥) 7→ EMP]
)
.
Then according to Theorem Instrumented Execution, when the program termi-
nates after n steps, we have ∃T ′,R. GSafe1(T ′ ] [0 7→ (−, V,R, Jx.P K)],−,−), which im-
plies RV JP [V/x]K and thus JP [V/x]K 6= ∅. ut
8 Conclusion
We present a verification logic for weak memory programs GPS+, by enhancing the
GPS mechanism with two new forms of assertions: shareable assertions 〈P 〉 and
waiting-to-be-acquired assertions P . This change enables us to control more pre-
cisely the synchronisations that happen between threads, making the reasoning about
relaxed atomics and fences possible.
Our work is closely related to GPS [23] and RSL [24], both of which focus on
program verification under the C11 weak memory model. RSL was intended to pro-
vide support for reasoning about release-acquire accesses in the style of Concurrent
Separation Logic (CSL) [19]. Our logic inherits several ideas from GPS, including
per-location protocols and escrows, which are also relevant with a previous work
[22]. Another important concept we borrow from GPS are ghost resources as PCMs.
This idea is related with [5], [11], [16], and a recent work [13].
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Future work includes the incorporation of release sequence and the consideration
of more memory orders like consume load. The most recent work [21] demonstrates
the power of GPS in reasoning about real code and inspires us to apply our logic to
more real code.
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